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Keynote Article
Future War, Future Law
Eric Talbot Jensen
ABSTRACT
Advancing technology will dramatically affect the weapons
and tactics of future armed conflict, including the “places”
where conflicts are fought, the “actors” by whom they are fought,
and the “means and methods” by which they are fought. These
changes will stress even the fundamental principles of the law of
armed conflict, or LOAC. While it is likely that the
contemporary LOAC will be sufficient to regulate the majority of
future conflicts, the international community must be willing to
evolve the LOAC in an effort to ensure these future weapons and
tactics remain under control of the law.
Though many of these advancing technologies are still in
the early stages of development and design, the time to act is
now. In anticipation of these developments, the international
community needs to recognize the gaps in the current LOAC and
seek solutions in advance of the situation. As the LOAC evolves
to face anticipated future threats, it will help ensure that
advancing technologies comply with the foundational principles
of the LOAC and future armed conflicts remain constrained by
law.
---------I would like to express my gratitude to the Minnesota
Journal of International Law for inviting me to this

Associate Professor, Brigham Young University Law School. The author
wishes to express gratitude to the staff of the Minnesota Journal of
International Law for having the foresight to organize a symposium on such
an important issue and for editorial assistance on the article. The author also
expresses gratitude to Allison Arnold and Aaron Worthen for invaluable
research assistance. A video recording of this speech can be found on the
Minnesota
Journal
of
International
Law’s
website,
http://www.minnjil.org/?page_id=913.
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symposium, and really, for having this symposium. This is a
very important subject and one which, if we do not engage on
now, we will miss an opportunity to really have an impact on
the future of the law of armed conflict.
In a recent address, Harold Koh, the State Department
Legal Advisor, said “Increasingly, we find ourselves addressing
twenty-first-century challenges with twentieth-century laws.”1
Mr. Koh is not the only person to espouse this belief.2 The
twenty-first century challenges that Mr. Koh is referring to
involve rapidly advancing technologies and changing tactics
that are beginning to seriously challenge even the foundational
principles of the Law of Armed Conflict, or LOAC.3 I would like
to spend the next few minutes discussing what I think are some
waning factors in future armed conflicts and the resulting
waning legal norms and then attempt a brief peek into the
future factors that will emerge from advancing technologies
and even posit some suggestions concerning emerging legal
norms.
I do this with some trepidation. As Louise Doswald-Beck
stated, “Any attempt to look into the future is fraught with
difficulty and the likelihood that much of it will be wrong.” 4
However, I believe that we are currently at a point when we
can see into the future of armed conflict and project, at least to
some degree, the effect of advancing technologies on armed
conflict and the governing LOAC. It is likely that the
1. Harold Hongju Koh, The State Department Legal Adviser’s Office:
Eight Decades in Peace and War, 100 GEO. L.J. 1747, 1772 (2012).
2. See Rosa Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and
the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 745
(2004); P.W. Singer, Address at the United States Naval Academy William C.
Stutt Ethics Lecture: Ethical Implications of Military Robotics (Mar. 25, 2009),
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/usna_singer_robot_ethics.pdf.
3. See Koh, supra note 1, at 1772.
4. Louise Doswald-Beck, Implementation of International Humanitarian
Law in Future Wars, in 71 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW
STUDIES 39, 39 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1998); see also
Stephen Peter Rosen, The Future of War and the American Military, HARV .
MAG., May–June 2002, at 29 (“The people who run the American military have
to be futurists, whether they want to be or not. The process of developing and
building new weapons takes decades, as does the process of recruiting and
training new military officers. As a result, when taking such steps, leaders are
making statements, implicitly or explicitly, about what they think will be
useful many years in the future.”). Despite the difficulty, it is a vital
requirement of militaries and one in which plenty of people are still willing to
engage. See Frank Jacobs & Parag Khanna, The New World, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/09/23/opinion/sunday/thenew-world.html.
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contemporary LOAC will be sufficient to regulate the majority
of future conflicts, but we must be willing and able to evolve the
LOAC in an effort to ensure these future weapons and tactics
remain under control of the law.
Our current situation is not unlike those who met at the
Lateran Council of 1139. 5 Tradition has it that at the council,
one of the issues raised was the new invention of the crossbow. 6
The crossbow caused alarm for several reasons. First, it
allowed killing at a distance, which was not the traditional way
of combat.7 Secondly, it allowed a peasant who was properly
trained to kill a knight.8 This combination meant that a
peasant, who was traditionally of little value as a fighter, could
now kill a knight, an asset of great value and a major
investment in training and equipment.9
Consequently, the Council outlawed the use of the
crossbow, at least when Christians were fighting each other.10
Of course, that legal prohibition hardly survived the vote that
was taken to sustain it.11 The important point this example
makes is that as we contemplate future technologies and their
linkage with the law, we have to take a practical view. We
cannot assume that we can merely pronounce a developing
weapon or tactic as illegal and expect universal compliance. 12
That is not the lesson history teaches us.13

5. See generally Harold E. Harris, Modern Weapons and the Law of Land
Warfare, 12 MIL. L. & L. WAR REV. 7, 9 (1973).
6. Martin van Creveld, The Clausewitzian Universe and the Law of War,
J. CONTEMP. HIST. 403, 416 (1991).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See id. (“The story of the early firearms which, by enabling a
commoner to kill a knight from afar, threatened the continued existence of the
medieval world, is well known.”).
10. Harris, supra note 5, at 9; Donna Marie Verchio, Just Say No? The
SIrUS Project: Well-Intentioned, But Unnecessary and Superfluous, 51 A.F. L.
REV. 183, 187 (2001).
11. See W.T. Mallison, Jr., The Laws of War and the Juridical Control of
Weapons of Mass Destruction in General and Limited Wars, 36 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 308, 316 (1967) (discussing the continued use of the crossbow after the
ban).
12. Id.
13. Vericho, supra note 10, at 187 (“The situation at that point in history
is the same we observe today-no weapon has been effectively restricted or
eliminated by international regulation.”).
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For convenience of my analysis, I will focus on the “places”
where conflicts are fought, the “actors” by whom they are
fought, and the “means and methods” by which they are fought.
I remind you that predicting the future is not a promising line
of work, and I do this hesitantly. My guess is that many of you
will take issue with my characterization of what the future
holds. However, I hope that even if you disagree with me, you
will see the value of having the discussion and engaging on the
issue of evolving the law of war in order to maintain its
relevance in your version of the future.
Lest I be misunderstood, I am certainly not saying that
these principles of law are no longer binding or useful in any
situations throughout the world. Undoubtedly, advancing
technologies which test these laws will emerge gradually and
unequally among the international community. The majority of
the current LOAC will continue to apply to most armed
conflicts for the foreseeable future, but as technologies continue
to advance, particularly among the advanced nations of the
world, the LOAC will need to evolve to keep pace with
innovation.
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I. PLACES

Throughout history, armed conflict has taken place in
“breathable air” zones—the land, the surface of the ocean, and
recently the air above the land.14 As the LOAC developed, these
breathable air zones were concurrently being divided into areas
of sovereign control,15 with the exception of the high seas and
the commons, such as the poles.16 The effect of this was that
the LOAC developed around rules governing sovereign territory
and was based on presumptions about where armed conflict
would occur.17 These presumptions are now losing their
applicability, requiring the international community to
14. See David Alexander, Pentagon to Treat Cyberspace as "Operational
Domain",
REUTERS,
July
14,
2011,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/14/us-usa-defense-cybersecurityidUSTRE76D5FA20110714 (identifying the “air, land and sea” as traditional
areas of operational domain for the military).
15. Eric Talbot Jensen, Applying a Sovereign Agency Theory of the Law of
Armed Conflict, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 685, 707–09 (2012).
16. See generally Ron Purver, Security and Arms Control at the Poles 39
INT’L J.888, 888–92 (1984) (discussing historical examples of the use of the
poles for military purposes and noting that military operations in the poles
were eventually banned for all countries in the first article of the Antarctic
Treaty).
17. See Singer, supra note 2 at 14–16 (noting that “going to war” has
meant the same thing for 5,000 years and the changing nature of law raises
legal questions never before considered).
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reconsider the validity of many LOAC provisions.18
A. WANING FACTORS

I will not discuss each of my proposed waning factors, but
several deserve specific mention. As I mentioned a moment ago,
one of the most important waning factors in future conflict is
the limitation to breathable air zones.19 As I will discuss later
concerning “actors,” the limitation of operating in breathable
air zones is swiftly disappearing.20 Miniaturization and robotics
are opening areas to use that have previously not been
available.21 We will soon not think of the ability to breath as a
limitation on our ability to operate. As technology increases,
military planners will not feel constrained by human
restrictions, but will find other tools that can function equally

18. Id. at 16 (suggesting one reason the LOAC needs to be reconsidered is
that modern enemies know the laws and are using them to their advantage).
19. Alexander, supra note 14.
20. Id. (discussing the increased need for protection from cyber-attacks
and suggesting the United States has suffered $1 trillion in economic losses as
a result of past cyber-attacks).
21. Jon Cartwright, Rise of the Robots and the Future of War, THE
OBSERVER
(Nov.
20,
2010),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/nov/21/military-robotsautonomous-machines (discussing the increasing role of robots in warfare and
how technological developments will likely change warfare).
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well in these areas that lack breathable oxygen.22
Just as advancing technologies have opened access to new
areas, existing geographic boundaries are beginning to feel
pressure from scientific innovation. Armed conflict has for
centuries been based on the Westphalian style demarcation of
boundaries.23 Crossing the boundary with your army was a sign
that armed conflict had begun.24 People on one side of the
boundary generally associated themselves with one group of
fighters and people on the other side with the other group.25
This perspective on geographic boundaries is diminishing.26
Individuals do not necessarily limit themselves or their
emotional or patriotic attachments by the geographic
boundaries which surround them.27 Other means of association,
such as global social networking, are lessening the perceived
binding nature of geographic affiliations.28
Speaking of Westphalia, the system of state supremacy
instituted by the post-Westphalian peace is quickly eroding.29
States find their sovereignty threatened both politically and
22. Nick Hopkins, Militarisation of Cyberspace: How the Global Power
Struggle
Moved
Online,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
16,
2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/apr/16/militarisation-ofcyberspace-power-struggle (discussing an assertion made by the head of the
US Military, General Martin Dempsey, that the United States needed to fully
include space and cyberspace operations along with its traditional air-land-sea
operations).
23. See generally PHILIP C. BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR ,
PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY 75–143, 501–538 (2002) (detailing
historical armed conflicts and describing how boundaries factored into the
conflicts).
24. See Saikrishna Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs of War: What the
Constitution Means by “Declare War”, 93 CORN. L. REV. 45, 67–77 (November
2007).
25. See Koh, supra note 1, at 1772 (suggesting the traditional actors in
wars were blocs of countries, but the actors in future conflicts will likely be
“networks of actors connected in countless tangible and intangible ways”).
26. Id.; Frederic Megret, War and the Vanishing Battlefield, 9 LOY. U.
CHI. INT’L L. REV. 131, 131–33 (2011) (discussing the classic notion of a
battlefield and its diminishing relevance in modern conflicts).
27. See Singer, supra note 2, at 11 (discussing a fundraiser held by college
students at Swarthmore to take a stand against genocide in Darfur in which
the proceeds were used to enter negotiations to rent drones to deploy to
Sudan).
28. See Koh, supra note 1, at 1771–72 (“[W]e live in an age not divided by
a Berlin Wall but linked by a World Wide Web.”).
29. See generally Bobbitt, supra note 7, at 283–342, 667–807 (discussing
how the development of the market-state and increasing number of global
problems such as AIDS, environmental issues, and the changing landscape of
war are eroding traditional notions of state sovereignty).
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territorially by a number of emerging forces, supra- and
supernational in nature.30 It used to be that States were the
final speaker on issues considered incident to sovereignty, such
as the internal and external use of force, domestic policing,
treatment of citizens, and relations with peers.31 Statecentricity as the sole way of viewing the world is waning and
being overtaken by other views that have much more traction
today.32 I am not arguing that the state system is going away,
but that its exclusivity—and possibly its supremacy in relation
to certain previously sovereign prerogatives—is evaporating.
Finally, just a word about consent; much has been said
lately about consent as the basis for extraterritorial military
actions. The United States continues to rely—at least in part—
on consent for its prosecution of the war on terror in countries
such as Yemen and Pakistan. 33 The question remains
unanswered as to whether, if that consent were removed, the
United States would cease military operations it could justify
under a self-defense argument.34 I believe that the U.S. is
setting a precedent that will inevitably weaken the doctrine of
consent and, coupled with the weakening of geographic borders,
allow future military actions under various self-defense
theories that will dramatically weaken the need for consent.

30. Id.
31. See Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and its
Implications for International Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 7, 7–8 (1998).
32. Id. (discussing the abundance of scholarship produced by economists,
businessmen, political scientists, and journalists that suggests the statecentric model is on the decline).
33. Greg Miller, Yemen’s Leader Says He Approves All Drone Strikes,
WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2012, at A3; Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman & Evan
Perez, U.S. Unease Over Drone Strikes, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904441004045776415208580114
52.html.
34. Entous, Gorman & Perez, supra note 33 (noting the United States
believes it has broad authority to defend itself against those who planned the
attacks of September 11, 2001).
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B. WANING LAW

The waning of these (and other) factors will impact the law
and particularly the LOAC. As geographic boundaries lose
meaning and the primacy of states wanes, a number of
particular LOAC principles will face increasing attack.
The bifurcation of the LOAC between international armed
conflicts, or IACs, and non-international armed conflicts, or
NIACs, is already under fire.35 The International Committee of
the Red Cross, or ICRC,36 as well as international tribunals 37
35. Jensen, supra note 15, at 702–706.
36. See Jakob Kellenberger, ICRC President, Address at the Sixtieth
Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions: Sixty Years of the Geneva
Conventions: Learning from the Past to Better Face the Future (Aug. 12,
2009),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/genevaconventions-statement-president-120809.htm; Jakob Kellenberger, ICRC
President, Address at the Follow-Up Meeting to the Sixtieth Anniversary of
the Geneva Conventions: Strengthening Legal Protection for Victims of Armed
Conflicts (Sept. 21, 2010), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/
statement/ihl-development-statement-210910.htm.
37. In addition to the quote beginning Section V, the Tadić Appellate
Court also argued that “[i]f international law, while of course duly
safeguarding the legitimate interests of States, must gradually turn to the
protection of human beings, it is only natural that the [bifurcation between
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and renowned scholars38 have all argued that the LOAC
bifurcation has lost its usefulness. In a powerful quote by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), the Court stated “What is inhumane, and consequently
proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhumane and
inadmissible in civil strife.”39 The division of the binding nature
of LOAC principles, those that apply to NIACs and those that
apply to IACs, is quickly becoming obsolete.40
Little needs to be said about the declaration of war, a now
antiquated idea.41 As Robert Turner has written, “Although
conflicts between and among states continue, no state has
issued a formal declaration of war [since the 1948 Arab-Israeli
War].”42 Similarly, the idea that conflicts terminate with a
formal agreement on cessation of hostilities also lacks
currency.43 It is hard to imagine the United States signing a
peace accord with the various iterations of al-Qaeda to signify
the formal end to that conflict.44
IAC and NIAC] should gradually lose its weight.” Prosecutor v Tadić, Case No.
IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
38. See Emily Crawford, Unequal Before the Law: The Case for the
Elimination of the Distinction between International and Non-International
Armed Conflicts, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 441, 483–84 (2007); Avril McDonald,
The Year in Review, 2 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 113, 121 (1998) (“With the
increase in the number of internal and internationalised armed conflicts is
coming greater recognition that a strict division of conflicts into internal and
international is scarcely possible, if it ever was.”); see also Michael Reisman,
Remarks at a Panel on the Application of Humanitarian Law in
Noninternational Armed Conflicts (Apr. 18, 1991), in 85 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 83, 85 (suggesting a bifurcated system serves as “a sweeping exclusion
device that permits the bulk of armed conflict to evade full international
regulation”); Michael N. Schmitt, Yoram Dinstein & Charles H.B. Garraway,
The Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict: With
Commentary,
INT’L
INST.
HUMANITARIAN
L.
(2006),
http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/The%20Manual%20on%20the%20Law%20
of%20NIAC.pdf (suggesting that laws addressing the growing problems
created by NIACs need to be developed).
39. Prosecutor v Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 119 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
40. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
41. ROBERT F. TURNER, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: ITS
IMPLEMENTATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 25 (1983).
42. Id.
43. Brooks, supra note 2, at 725–729 (noting the erosion of temporal
restrictions on some international conflicts).
44. Id. at 726 (suggesting a peace accord between the United States and
al-Qaeda is unlikely for several reasons, including the nature of the “war on
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While technically not a part of the LOAC, the distinction
between the applicability of the jus ad bellum, or the law of
going to war, and the jus in bello, or the LOAC, is also on the
wane.45 Current technologies such as cyber warfare have led
many to discuss the difficulty of determining when states are
actually in armed conflict.46 Future technologies will make that
an even more difficult distinction to make as the idea of
crossing a border to signal hostilities becomes increasingly
anachronistic.47
Finally for this section, the law of neutrality will also
become less and less applicable as geographic boundaries
become more porous and states struggle to maintain the
monopoly of violence. The soon-to-be-published “Tallinn
Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Warfare,”48 in which I participated, struggled to apply the
doctrines of neutrality to cyber warfare and acknowledged that
the current rules need to evolve to deal effectively with future
technologies.49

terrorism” and fact that al-Qaeda is not a state and as such may not be able to
enter a formal peace agreement).
45. Eyal Benvenisti, Rethinking the Divide Between Jus ad Bellum and
Jus in Bello in Warfare Against Nonstate Actors, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 541, 541–
42 (2009).
46. Sean Watts, Low-Intensity Computer Network Attack and SelfDefense, in 87 INT’L L. STUD. 59, 71–72 (Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo & Daria P.
Wollschlager eds., 2011).
47. See id.; Megret, supra note 26, at 132 (noting that the notion of the
traditional “battlefield” is disappearing).
48. THE TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
CYBER WARFARE 214 (Michael N. Schmitt ed.) (forthcoming March 2013).
49. Id. at 212, see generally Eric Talbot Jensen, Sovereignty and
Neutrality in Cyber Conflict, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 815, 838–841 (2012).
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C. EMERGING FACTORS

The lack of limitation to breathable air zones will move
armed conflict to areas where it is currently not occurring.50
Future armed conflicts will occur without respect to national
borders, on the seabed, under the ground, and in space.51 It will
also occur across the newly recognized domain of cyberspace. 52
And it will occur in all of these places simultaneously.
The United States has already demonstrated in its “Global
War on Terror” that the LOAC is not well prepared to regulate
an armed conflict against a transnational non-state terrorist
actor who does not associate itself with geographic boundaries.
53 The waning geographic affiliation and increasing global
social affiliation which will be discussed more later will create
transnational linkages between previously unconnected people
50. See Hopkins, supra note 22.
51. Id.
52. Alexander, supra note 14.
53. Megret, supra note 26, at 132 (arguing that the “death of the
battlefield significantly complicates the waging of war and may well herald
the end of the laws of war as a way to regulate violence).
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will make identifying the battlefield extremely difficult.
Mackubin Owens has written that “multidimensional war in
the future is likely to be characterized by distributed, weakly
connected battlefields.”54
Few of these areas have seen armed conflict to this point.55
And perhaps that will continue. However, as technology
advances and these areas become available for weaponization,
or at least for the placement of sensors, the temptation to
militarize these areas will be irresistible.56
D. EMERGING LAW

Many of these individual domains just discussed are
regulated by a treaty regime. For example, the Outer Space
Treaty discourages military activities in space.57 There is also a
treaty which prohibits the use of nuclear weapons on the ocean
floor or seabed.58 These international agreements will become
54. Mackubin Thomas Owens, Reflections on Future War, 61 NAVAL WAR
C. REV. 61, 71 (2008).
55. See Hopkins, supra note 22 (suggesting more sophisticated tools of
cyber-warfare exist but have rarely been used).
56. Id. (suggesting the potential to conduct future military operations in
space and cyberspace).
57. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies arts. 3-4, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 201.
58. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and
in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, 955 U.N.T.S. 115.
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more and more difficult to apply and to comply with.59
Even if states continue to regard these rules as binding in
the face of the transformation of geographic boundaries, these
agreements still serve only to bind states.60 The continuing
diversification of actors in armed conflict will force states to
consider whether they should remain militarily outside of these
areas while non-state actors begin to operate within;61 states
will reconsider their legal obligations and take actions to
establish control in these currently unmilitarized areas.62 Laws
might form to authorize states to exclude non-state actors from
operating in these areas.63 A new regime established around
the global commons, ensuring state access but allowing states
to enforce exclusion to non-state actors, could develop.64
Many possibilities exist for resolution here, but the new
legal answer will revolve around actors, rather than geographic
boundaries. The commons will be accessible by certain actors,
rather than open to all.
This focus on actors and their impact on the places where
armed conflict will occur in the future provides an excellent
transition to the next area of emphasis—actors in future armed
conflict.

59. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 4 (“In the light of such developments,
States cannot continue to simply assume that the present scope of application
of humanitarian law treaties suffices.”).
60. See id. (“Recent attempts by the government of Colombia to indicate
clearly that the new treaty banning antipersonnel mines applies to non-State
entities ran into difficulties when certain Western governments could not
accept the proposition that such entities might have responsibilities under
international law.”).
61. Mégret, supra note 26, at 145, 148-151.
62. See id. at 149, 151 (“However, it is not only ‘transnational terrorists’
who fundamentally change the nature of the battlefield, but also the states
that chose to follow them on that terrain, effectively fighting ‘a war’ as if it
unfolded on a ‘global battlefield.’. . . [H]umanitarians have been tempted to
extend the scope of the battlefield to make sure that as much violence as
possible falls under its constraints.”).
63. See Wolff Heintchel von Heinegg, Current Legal Issues in Martime
Operations, 80 INT’L L. STUD. 207, 216 for precedent on exclusion zones in the
context of, and questionable legality, under traditional LOAC.
64. See id.
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II. ACTORS

The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols
categorize everyone in armed conflict as either combatants or
civilians.65 The United States continues to assert that there is a
small category of individuals who exist in the twilight between
these two categories, most recently known as “unprivileged
belligerents.”66 Within the category of civilians are individuals
who forfeit their protections by taking a “direct part in
hostilities.”67 As the post 9-11 “War on Terror” has progressed,
this category has been understood to include organized armed
groups68 (e.g. terrorist organizations). There is much we could
65. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
arts. 3, 4, 6, Aug. 12, 1949, U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 50, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
66. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Respondents’
Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to
Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In Re: Guantanamo Bay Detainee
Litigation, NO. 08-0442 (D.D.C., filed March 13, 2009); Prosecuting Terrorists;
Civilian and Military Trials for GTMO and Beyond: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 47 (2009) (statement of Michael J. Edney,
Counsel, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP.).
67. Protocol I, supra note 65, art. 51.
68. Nils Melzer, Int’l Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of
Direct Participation in Hostilities, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 991, 1006-09
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say about these categorizations, but the waters on these issues
will get deeper and murkier.
A. WANING FACTORS

As mentioned previously, the LOAC was formulated
largely based on a Westphalian model of state sovereignty.69
Principles such as reciprocity70 and the state’s monopolization
of force71 were foundational principles which undergird the
LOAC, especially the provisions applying to actors on the
battlefield. However, the notion of a battlefield populated by
only organized state militaries who comply with all aspects of
the LOAC is not what future battlefields will be like, if they
ever were like that.72 Modern battlefields are fluid and illdefined spaces where the actors are seldom clearly identified73
(2008), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/review
/review-872-p991.htm.
69. See generally BOBBITT, supra note 23, at 75–143, 501–538.
70. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 4, at 41 (“[R]eciprocity did become
important with the introduction of new rules in treaties, namely, the
international law rule that parties need to be bound by the treaties in
question.”).
71. Jensen, supra note 15, at 708, 715.
72. Kellenberger, supra note 36.
73. Sean Watts, Law-of-War Perfidy (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author.).
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and often not even present at the place of attack.74
The vast majority of the armed conflicts in recent decades
have not been between states, but between states and non-state
actors or between two groups of non-state actors.75 Advancing
technologies will make this phenomena even more
pronounced.76 The ability of non-state actors to exert state-level
violence combined with the diminishing association of
individuals and groups to states will result in the waning of
many factors currently prevalent in armed conflict.77
A result of the decreasing number of armed conflicts
between states is that fewer and fewer conflicts occur between
“combatants” and more and more involve some form of
“fighters,” whether those be organized armed groups, narcoterrorists, or individuals who are directly participating in
hostilities.78 The changing nature of participants in armed
conflict should cause a reassessment of the applicability of the
current LOAC paradigm. This process has already begun with
the ICRC’s issuance of the Interpretive Guidance on Direct
Participation in Hostilities.79 This tacit acceptance that the
current understanding that the LOAC needs updated is a
harbinger of things to come. Future armed conflict will
undoubtedly increase the difficulty of defining actors on the
battlefield.80 The differentiation between fighters and nonfighters will become even more blurred as global technologies
allow linkages and associations among people not contemplated
in 1949 or 1977.81
In addition to the categorization of participants in armed
74. Megert, supra note 26, at 154 (“[T]his will cover crimes committed
outside actual battle zones but that nonetheless display a strong element of
connection to them.”).
75. Themnér, Lotta Themnér & Peter Wallensteen, 2012. Armed Conflicts
by Type, 1946-2011, 49(4) JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH 565, 566, 568 (2012),
available
at
http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/122/122552_conflict_type_2011.pdf.
76. See Watts, supra note 46, at 61 (“Second, and related, CNA will
produce a significantly expanded cast of players, creating a complex and
uncontrollable multipolar environment comprising far more States and nonState actors pursuing far more disparate interests than in previous security
settings. CNA are unprecedented conflict levelers.”).
77. See id. at 62, 73, 76 (“Either one accepts a real threat to the positive
jus ad bellum’s claim to law, or one accepts very real threats to States’ security
as a trade-off for preserving legal idealism.”).
78. See Jensen, supra note 15; Crawford, supra note 38, at 442.
79. See Melzer, supra note 68.
80. See Mégret, supra note 26, at 138; Watts, supra note 46.
81. See Mégret, supra note 26, at 138; Brooks, supra note 2, at 677.
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conflict, the ability to attribute actions in armed conflict to
specific actors is being significantly undermined through the
use of advancing technologies. Cyber operations are a good
example of this difficulty. The difficulty of attributing cyber
actions has been well documented.82 The ability to hide one’s
identity or appear to be someone else is more problematic with
stand-off weapons such as cyber weapons. Future weapons will
continue to make attribution difficult, forcing the international
community to reevaluate the approach to attribution.
B. WANING LAW

The increasing conflation of fighters and civilians will
devalue the legal distinctions between combatant and civilian
as categories that determine protections from targeting.83 To
the extent that the legal classification is useful in current
armed conflicts, its utility will decrease as asymmetrical
disadvantages force non-state fighters to seek anonymity while
taking part in hostilities.84
The results of this conflation will undermine the current
regime of status-based targeting and instead require most
targeting decisions to be based on conduct.85 Recent conflicts in
82. Collin Allan, Attribution Issues in Cyberspace, CHI.–KENT J. INT'L &
COMP. L. (forthcoming May 2013).
83. Brooks supra note 2, at 730-31, 761.
84. See Watts, supra note 46, at 72-73.
85. See Brooks, supra note 2, at 706, 756-57 (“Thus, for instance, one's
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Iraq and Afghanistan have already verified this emerging
trend.86 Status-based targeting will only be applicable to a very
limited number of circumstances and will force states to look
for other means of determining targets.87
The inability to meaningfully differentiate between actors
on the battlefield will have a detrimental effect on the bedrock
principle of distinction.88 As states suffer devastating effects
from non-attributable sources, the pressure for an evolved
understanding of the principle of distinction will be great. For
example, protecting a nation’s critical infrastructure from
computer attack89 may be so important that attribution (and
even individualized distinction) may become a casualty of the
need to prevent significant social harm.90

status as a ‘lawful combatant’ under the Geneva Conventions hinges, as a
threshold matter, not on one's substantive actions but on certain questions of
form: whether one is under responsible command, whether one wears ‘a fixed
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance,’ and whether one carries arms
openly. . . . Status as a lawful combatant should not hinge on whether a person
is ‘commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates,’ has a ‘fixed
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance’ (e.g, a uniform or other sign by
which combatants can be visually distinguished from civilians), or whether
she ‘carr[ies] arms openly.’”).
86. Id. passim.
87. See Watts, supra note 46 ; Mégret, supra note 26.
88. See Mégret, supra note 26.
89. See Sean M. Condron, Getting it Right: Protecting American Critical
Infrastructure in Cyberspace, 20 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 403, 421 (2007).
90. See id.
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C. EMERGING FACTORS

At the sixty-year commemoration of the Geneva
Conventions, then-President of the ICRC, Jakob Kellenberger,
stated that “the potential range of ‘new actors’ whose actions
have repercussions at the international level is of course vast.
While many of these ‘new actors’ have in fact been around for
some time, they have called into question—and will continue to
call into question—some of the more traditional assumptions
on which the international legal system is based.”91
I divide my remarks in this area into two subcategories:
91. Jakob Kellenberger, President, Int’l Red Cross, Sixty Years of the
Geneva Conventions and the Decades Ahead at the Conference on the
Challenges for IHL posed by New Threats, New Actors and New Means and
Methods
of
War,
ICRC
(Sept.
11,
2009),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/geneva-conventionstatement-091109.htm.
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emerging factors concerning influences on “existing actors” and
emerging factors concerning “new actors.” I will begin with the
latter category.
This Article has already alluded to the break-down of
geographic boundaries and the resulting traditional
associations. Modern and future social networking capabilities
will allow instantaneous linkages between individuals and
groups from across the globe. These “instantaneous
transnational communities of interest” mean that, as Jeffrey
Walker argues, “[i]t’s simply no longer necessary to have a
state sponsor for an interested group of people to effect changes
within the international community.”92 Anthony Lake describes
how these instantaneous transnational communities of interest
use “technology to forge vast alliances across borders, and . . . a
whole host of new actors challenging, confronting, and
sometimes competing with governments on turf that was once
their exclusive domain.”93 Philip Bobbitt has written, “The
internet enabled the aggregation of dissatisfied and malevolent
persons into global networks.”94
Social networking’s effects on armed conflict have already
been demonstrated during the Arab Spring.95 The future effects
of this phenomenon will undoubtedly increase over time.
Audrey Kurth Cronin draws the analogy between social
networking and the levée en masse. She argues that it allows
cyber mobilization of people across the entire globe on issues of
common ideology.96 The result of this expanding social
networking linkage is that people will begin to view themselves
less as Americans or Germans or Iranians and more as
members of global ideologies created, maintained, and
mobilized through social media.97 The resulting cultural
92. Jeffrey K. Walker, Thomas P. Keenan Memorial Lecture: The Demise
of the Nation-State, the Dawn of New Paradigm Warfare, and a Future
Profession of Arms, 51 A.F. L. REV. 323, 329330329-30 (2001).
93. Walker, supra note 92, at 330 (quoting ANTHONY LAKE, SIX
NIGHTMARES: REAL THREATS IN A DANGEROUS WORLD AND HOW AMERICA CAN
MEET THEM 281–82 (2000)).
94. Philip C. Bobbitt, Inter Arma Enim Non Silent Leges, View of Law and
War, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 253, 259 (2012).
95. George Griffin, Egypt's Uprising:Tracking the Social Media Factor,
PBS.ORG
(Apr.
20,
2011),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/middle_east/jan-june11/revsocial_0419.html.
96. Audrey Kurth Cronin, Cyber-Mobilization: the New Levée en Masse, 36
PARAMETERS 77 passim (2006).
97. See Michigan State University News, Civilian Cyber-Warriors Not
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uncertainty will provide a means and incentive for like-minded
individuals to connect and interact on areas of agreement that
are not determined by geographic borders or national
affiliation.
These groups will use social networks to recruit, gather
resources, provide financial support, collect and pass
intelligence, and create and transmit plans of action including
attacks. The communications will occur far from where the
effects of the communications will eventually be felt, but could
conceivably have significant effects on ongoing armed conflicts.
A current example of a developing trend is the computer
activist group known as “Anonymous.”98 In addition to stateaffiliated hacking groups and their documented participation in
armed conflict,99 hacktivists, who have organized themselves
around a social theme or ideology, such as the members of
Anonymous, have also started to take part in armed conflict.100
While many of the participants are conscious of the
influence of social networking on armed conflict, advancing
technology will increase the likelihood that individuals and
groups will become unwitting “direct participants.” As will be
discussed later, the use of future technologies such as virology
and nanotechnology will allow attackers to increase the reach
of their weapons by using the civilian population to propagate
their weapons.101 A DNA-coded virus will eventually reach its
target after harmlessly passing through the population.102
Cyber attackers will use the same methodology. As with

Driven by Patriotism, MICH. ST. U. RES. (Sept. 10, 2012),
http://research.msu.edu/tags/cyber-warriors.
98. Anonymous,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
8,
2012),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/anonymous
_internet_group/index.html.
99. Collin Allan, supra note 82; David E. Hoffman, The New Virology:
From Stuxnet to Biobombs, The Future of War by Other Means, 185 FOREIGN
POL’Y
78,
80
(2011),
available
at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/the_new_virology?print=yes
&hidecomments=yes&page=full.
100. Jana Winter & Jeremy A. Kaplan, Communications Blackout Doesn't
Deter Hackers Targeting Syrian Regime, FOXNEWS.COM (Nov. 30, 2012),
http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2012/11/30/hackers-declare-war-onsyria/#ixzz2Ht69GA1J.
101. Id.
102. Andrew Hessel, Marc Goodman & Steven Kotler, Hacking the
President’s
DNA,
ATLANTIC
MAG.
(Nov.
2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/11/hacking-the-presidentsdna/309147/.
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STUXNET,103 malware will be fashioned to spread broadly
through the internet but only cause damage to specific systems
in a precision targeted attack.104 For this to work, individual
civilians and their computer systems will be a vital, though
unwitting, part of the attack. Similarly, hacktivists, such as the
members of Anonymous, participate along a spectrum of
activity. Some may be writers of harmful code; others may be
coordinators of the attack. Still others may simply leave their
computers on, allowing those running the malware to slave
their computers and put them to a nefarious use. In this way,
they may become unwitting participants. However, to the
individual or state being attacked, there will be almost no
timely way of ascertaining the difference. Nations will struggle
to deal with how to classify and then respond to such
individuals, especially when the groups are extremely large
and geographically dispersed.105
In addition to influences on actors, future technologies will
create wholly new actors that are either a limited part, or not
part at all, of the current paradigm.106 These new actors will
nonetheless emerge as important factors in future armed
conflict. These include those who deal in new types of
weapons—referred to as “new arms” dealers—global criminal
enterprises, corporate armies and robots or autonomous
weapon systems.
Advancing technology will provide a wide array of new
weapons, many of which do not require state financing and
organization to produce or market. In addition to computer
hacktivists, bio engineers who are creating viruses and other
DNA-linked tools are springing up around the world.107 There
is already a very lucrative market for cyber “arms.” It is

103. See Factbox: What is Stuxnet, REUTERS (Sept.. 24, 2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/24/us-security-cyber-iran-fbidUSTRE68N3PT20100924.
104. See Jeremy Richmond, Evolving Battlefields: Does Stuxnet
Demonstrate a Need For Modifications to the Law of Armed Conflict? 35
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 842 passim ((March 2012).
105. See Pierre Thomas &and Jack Cloherty, FBI, Facebook Team Up to
Fight 'Butterfly Botnet', ABC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2012), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/butterfly-botnet-targets-11-millionincluding-computer-users/story?id=17947276.
106. See Watts, supra note 46.
107. Hanno Charisius, Richard Friebe & Sascha, & Karberg, Becoming
Biohackers: Learning the Game, BBC FUTURE (Jan. 22, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20130122-how-we-became-biohackers-part-1.
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sourced almost exclusively by non-state actors.108 A similar
market for biological and genetic weapons will undoubtedly
emerge.109 Many of these individuals or groups will see this as
a business, not as dealing in weapons. Nevertheless, in some
instances, they will produce, transport, and even sometimes
unleash these new types of weapons on the targets.
In addition to these relatively unorganized groups, a
number of highly organized armed groups will emerge on the
future battlefield. These include corporate armies, including
private security companies (PSCs), and global criminal
enterprises.110 Recent events in Algeria111 are making
corporations rethink their reliance on state forces for protection
of multi-billion dollar complexes. Corporate assets will continue
to exist in unstable areas and even in areas of armed conflict.
Businesses whose annual revenue exceeds that of the gross
domestic product of the country in which they have assets are
unlikely to continue to rely on state forces or police for
protection if such protection fails. Rather, they will hire private
security companies or raise their own armies to ensure the
safety of their personnel and assets. ExxonMobil in Indonesia
and Talisman Energy in Sudan have already “hired” and/or
controlled national military forces to protect their business
interests.112 As armed conflicts ebb and flow, these corporate
armies will inevitably become involved in armed conflicts,
stressing the current application of the LOAC.113 Corporate
108. Michael Riley & Ashlee Vance, Cyber Weapons: The New Arms Race,
BUSINESSWEEK
(July
20,
2011),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/cyber-weapons-the-new-arms-race07212011.html.
109. See Charisius, supra note 107; Hessel, supra note 102.
110. See generally FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE AND
REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES (Simon Chesterman & Chia
Lehnhardt eds., 2007).
111. Aomar Ouali & Paul Schemm, Al-Qaida-linked Militants Seize BP
Complex in Algeria, Take Hostages Over Mali Intervention, YAHOO! NEWS,
Jan. 16, 2013, http://news.yahoo.com/al-qaida-linked-militants-seize-bpcomplex-algeria-185156149.html.
112. Jonathan Horlick et al., American and Canadian Civil Actions
Alleging Human Rights Violations Abroad by Oil and Gas Companies, 45
ALTA. L. REV. 653, 657–58 (2008); see also Developments in the Law,
International Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 2025, 2029–30 (2001).
113. See generally FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET, supra note 110; Eric
Talbot Jensen, Combatant Status: Is it Time for Intermediate Levels of
Recognition for Partial Compliance, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 214 (2005); Christopher
J. Mandernach, Warriors Without Law: Embracing a Spectrun of Status for
Military Actors, 7 APPALACHIAN J.L. 137 (2007). Christopher J.
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armies have already been implicated in “unlawful taking of
property, forced labor, displacement of populations, severe
damage to the environment, and the manufacture and trading
of prohibited weapons.”114 This trend will increase in the
future.
Another emerging factor is the role played by global
criminal enterprises. These would include organizations such
as the narco-traffickers operating in Mexico and other parts of
Central and South America.115 Reports place the number of
armed fighters supporting the narco-trafficking in Mexico alone
at over 100,000. 116 This army is substantially larger than the
armies involved in most recent armed conflicts.
Global criminal enterprises are also involved in other
illegal activity, including money laundering, arms smuggling,
counterfeiting, and the sex trade.117 Criminal enterprises often
have links to armed conflict because of the goods or services
that they offer.118 As demand for their goods increases, the
number of criminal enterprises will only increase.
We have just heard a truly superb discussion on robotics
and autonomous weapon systems.119 I will just add a few
comments of my own. I will revisit these weapons under the
category of means and methods of warfare, but to the extent
that robots or other similar weapons systems become
autonomous, they must also be considered as actors. We have
114. Regis Bismuth, Mapping a Responsibility of Corporations for
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Sailing Between International
and Domestic Legal Orders, 38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 203, 204 (2010); see
also Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Business and International Humanitarian
Law: An Introduction to the Rights and Obligations of Business Enterprises
Under International Humanitarian Law 24 (2006); Erik Mose et al., Corporate
Criminal Liability and the Rwandan Genocide, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 947,
973–974 (2008).
115. Carina Bergal, Note, The Mexican Drug War: The case for a NonInternational Armed Conflict Classification, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1042,
1066–72 (2011).
116. Id. at 1066.
117. John Evans, Criminal Networks, Criminal Enterprises, UNIV. B. C.,
INT’L
CTR.
FOR
CRIMINAL
LAW
REFORM,
at
2,
http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/publications/reports/netwks94.pdf (last visited Feb.
24, 2013).
118. Id.
119. To review these discussions, please see other Articles in 22 MINN. J.
INT’L L. (Summer 2013), as well as some articles found in 23 MINN. J. INT’L L.
(forthcoming Winter 2014). To see video recordings of the discussions that took
place at the 2013 Symposium, please see the Minnesota Journal of
International Law’s website, http://www.minnjil.org/?page_id=913.
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discussed both the Department of Defense’s recently issued
Directive titled “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,”120 which says
“autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be
designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise
appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force,” 121
and the Human Rights Watch report122 calling for a
multilateral treaty that would “prohibit the development,
production and use of fully autonomous weapons.”123 My
personal prognostication is that fully autonomous weapon
systems will absolutely make their way onto the battlefield and
eventually become the predominant actors. Having been in
combat, I believe that controlled and regulated use of
autonomous weapons systems can provide more reliable
responses in many cases than relying on human senses and
decision making. I am firmly convinced it is not a matter of “if,”
but “when.”
D. EMERGING LAW

We could spend much more time discussing the emerging
factors that will affect the actors in future armed conflict, but
let’s move to a discussion of the emerging law. I will highlight
two points that I think are important to this discussion: the
first is the merging of status and conduct by actors, and the
second is the effects on the principle of discrimination.
120. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPON
SYSTEMS (Nov. 21, 2012). This Directive followed a DoD Defense Science
Board Task Force Report issued in July of 2012. DEP’T OF DEF. DEF. SCI.
BOARD, THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN DOD SYSTEMS (July 2012), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/autonomy.pdf.
121. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPON
SYSTEMS (Nov. 21, 2012).
122. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST
KILLER
ROBOTS
(2012),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_0_0.pdf.
123. Id. at 5, 46.
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As alluded to previously, individuals are targeted based on
either their status as combatants or fighters or on their
inappropriate conduct as civilians. Emerging technologies and
tactics will make states want to blur these distinctions. For
example, the members of “Anonymous” who are preventing the
military leadership from communicating to subordinates are
likely taking a direct part in hostilities and are therefore
targetable. However, if the attack is generated by thousands of
slaved computers, some owned by witting participants, others
by unwitting participants, what are the targeting options for
the target state? Further, is the civilian recreational hacker
who develops the malware or establishes the botnet targetable?
In the area of virology, is the designer of the DNA-linked
virus targetable, even if he or she is just selling it to a
customer? It is unclear if that individual would be a direct
participant, especially if he did not know the eventual target of
the viral attack. What about an organization who sells such
DNA-linked viruses to the highest bidder? What about the
completely unwitting carrier of the virus who is about to enter
the auditorium where the President is about to speak and
doesn’t know that she is going to infect the President with the
lethal virus?124
Transnational social networking communities present
similar problems. As individuals pass along vital information,
including attack plans, do they become targetable? Their
counterparts in a geographically contained kinetic conflict
would be. Does the fact that these interactions occur thousands
of miles from the intended event and the originating group
make a targeting difference?
Transitioning now to the principle of discrimination, the
LOAC requires attackers to discriminate in the attack.125 We
could have a long discussion about what the word “attack”
means with respect to these new technologies, but I will delay
that to discuss the impact of new actors on the principle of
discrimination. Much has already been said about the need for
human discretion in the attack as it relates to autonomous
weapon systems. I will add my own thoughts just to say that
the requirement is that the attack is discriminate, not that a
human make the decision as to whether to conduct the attack
124. Hessel, supra note 102.
125. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I) art. 51, supra note 25, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29.
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or not.
We are making and using computer malware that is
making the ultimate decision on discrimination in the attack.
Stuxnet had been programmed to and was presumably acting
on its own when it identified the computer controlling the
centrifuges and then conducted the “attack” on that computer.
Emerging weapon systems will increasingly be making those
decisions through automated or natural processes that are
based on controlled circumstances. To the extent that our
current interpretation of discrimination is bothered by that, we
may have to evolve that LOAC understanding. I think it is
clear that autonomous weapons on the battlefield will increase,
and the autonomy of those weapon systems will also increase.
To the extent that we need to adjust the current understanding
of discrimination in the attack, the LOAC needs to be
responsive and evolve in order to ensure that these “actors” act
responsibly.
III. MEANS AND METHODS

Moving now to means and methods of warfare, since the
development of gunpowder, modern conflicts have been
characterized by heat, blast, and fragmentation. We have
recently included some innovative means of conflict including
numerous non-lethal weapon systems which have proven to be
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very effective. You will also note that I have cyber operations in
the category of existing means and methods, though I do not
believe that states have even begun to tap into the potential
cyber operations presents.
A. WANING FACTORS

Despite the fact that all of these means and methods will
continue to be a vital part of future armed conflicts, they will
not maintain the role they currently have. For example, while
most weapons will still likely use heat, blast, and
fragmentation as the primary source of injury, the proportion of
such weapons that are produced and used in any armed conflict
will steadily decrease. As other weapons that use advanced
technology enter the arsenal, they will provide more options to
the commander and will better suit his needs. For example, if a
commander had access to a DNA-linked virus that would
effectively kill an enemy leader, he could avoid all the LOAC
concerns such as proportionality and distinction that would be
part of a targeting analysis using heat, blast, and
fragmentation weapons such as a missile.
Similarly, the idea of an “attack” will wane in the face of
new weapons. The meaning of attack is defined in API as “acts
of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in
defence.”126 This definition is mired in the armed conflict of
heat, blast, and fragmentation which was characterized by
violence. However, such a definition is not clear enough to
adequately address the weapons of the future. Is a cyber-attack
an act of violence? What about infecting someone with a virus?
Certainly the victim of the DNA-linked virus is attacked, but
what about the intermediate carrier who is merely infected but
126. Id. art. 49, at 25.
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has no effects?
The important point this raises is that if infecting a host
carrier (or a thousand host carriers) with a DNA-linked virus
that has no physical effects is not an attack, the majority of the
LOAC principles would not apply to that action and would not
limit a commander’s ability to conduct such an action. A similar
analysis applies to cyber actions. Cyber operations that merely
cause inconvenience are likely not attacks and can therefore
potentially be targeted at civilians.127 Given the underlying
purposes of the LOAC, it is unlikely that this understanding of
“attack” can survive these new weapon systems and will have
to evolve to provide the protections expected from the LOAC.
One of the characteristics of heat, blast, and fragmentation
weapons was a limited dispersal. The military has computer
programs which model the blast radius of weapons to assist
commanders in making a correct proportionality analysis. The
limited dispersion of the weapon system is not an exact science,
but it is generally discernible. This may not be true of many
future weapon systems.
Stuxnet again provides an interesting perspective on this
topic. Despite its creators’ apparent best attempts, the malware
made it onto computers that it was not intended to infect.128
Though it did not have negative effects on those computers, 129
its dispersal was still not tightly controlled. Similar problems
will occur with other future weapons systems. The inability to
project the actual dispersal of some future weapons will make
this a waning principle in the conduct of future armed conflict.

127. See THE TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL
TO CYBER WARFARE, supra note 18, at 91–95, 133.

LAW APPLICABLE

128. See Holger Stark, Mossad’s Miracle Weapon: Stuxnet Virus Opens New
Era
of
Cyber
War,
SPEIGEL
ONLINE,
Aug.
8,
2011,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/mossad-s-miracle-weapon-stuxnetvirus-opens-new-era-of-cyber-war-a-778912.html.
129. Richmond, supra note 104, at 860–61.
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B. WANING LAW

I anticipate that my list of waning law will be quite
controversial, but remember that I am not necessarily saying
that these principles will disappear. My argument is that they
will wane as we currently know them. For example, though it is
not a LOAC principle, consider for a minute the jus ad bellum
principle of “use of force” as used in the UN Charter. This is
applicable here because presumably a use of force would be
governed by the LOAC. What level of cyber operation equates
to a “use of force?” There are differing views, though I think the
predominant view now is the effects test initially set out by
Michael Schmitt. However, like the previous discussion of
“attack,” these legal terms need to evolve to maintain their
currency and ability to regulate future armed conflict.
Similarly, the LOAC defining principle of “armed conflict”
will wane as well. The LOAC is not triggered until there is an
armed conflict. Traditionally, this required some level of
hostilities.130 In an era of bloodless weapons, as Blake and
130. See generally Commentary, Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 22–23 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960),
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Imburgia call them,131 is the trigger of “armed conflict” going to
be clear enough to regulate conflict? When is a cyber-operation
“armed?” Or the dispersion of nanobots? Or the spreading of
GENOMIC altering viruses?
These weapons will also make us reconsider time-honored
LOAC principles such as military objective, unnecessary
suffering, and proportionality. For example, one of the
potentially unanticipated consequences of Stuxnet is that it has
the possibility of being reengineered and reused.132 Bernhard
Langner who first discovered Stuxnet warns that such malware
can proliferate in unexpected ways: “Stuxnet’s attack code,
available on the Internet, provides an excellent blueprint and
jump-start for developing a new generation of cyber warfare
weapons. . . . Unlike bombs, missiles, and guns, cyber weapons
can be copied. The proliferation of cyber weapons cannot be
controlled. Stuxnet-inspired weapons and weapon technology
will soon be in the hands of rogue nation states, terrorists,
organized crime, and legions of leisure hackers.”133
The possibility of reengineering raises an interesting
question about the proportionality analysis for commanders.
With heat, blast, and fragmentation weapons, commanders did
not have to concern themselves with the potential of the
weapon being reused. However, with cyber malware such as
Stuxnet, or with a DNA-linked virus, or with a genetic
mutation, the malware, or virus or mutation remain and can be
reengineered, reused and resold, potentially leading to
significant impacts, including death and injury, on civilians
who were never even implicated in the original attack. Must
the commander consider this potentiality as he does his
proportionality analysis prior to using the weapon? I think the
LOAC does not yet provide a clear answer for that question. To
the extent that experts have opinions, I have found them to
differ widely.
Finally, another waning legal norm is arms control. Arms
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/375-590007?OpenDocument.
131. Duncan Blake & Joseph S. Imburgia, “Bloodless Weapons”? The Need
to Conduct Legal Reviews of Certain Capabilities and the Implications of
Defining Them as “Weapons”, 66 A.F. L. REV. 157 (2010).
132. See Mark Clayton, From the Man Who Discovered Stuxnet, Dire
Warnings One Year Later, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 22, 2011),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0922/From-the-man-who-discoveredStuxnet-dire-warnings-one-year-later.
133. David E. Hoffman, supra note 42 (quoting Ralph Langer, the German
industrial control systems security expert who discovered Stuxnet).
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control has been an effective means of limiting states in the
production and use of certain weapons, such as chemical134 or
biological agents,135 as well as nuclear weapons.136 However,
these international agreements have legally bound states but
do not reach non-state actors. In an age where many new
means and methods of warfare are not controlled or
controllable by states, but can be created in an individual’s
garage137 or office, arms control agreements lose much of their
value. Until the international community finds a way to get
individuals to agree to weapons controls and voluntarily
comply, arms control agreements will have limited utility for
many future weapon systems.

134. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for
signature Jan. 13, 1993, 3 U.N.T.S. 1974.
135. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, opened for signature Apr. 10, 1982, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/450?OpenDocument.
136. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclean Weapons, opened for
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970).
137. Wil S. Hylton, How Ready Are We for Bioterrorism? N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/magazine/how-ready-are-we-forbioterrorism.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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C. EMERGING FACTORS

U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn III
recently stated that “few weapons in the history of warfare,
once created, have gone unused.”138 This quote reinforces the
point demonstrated by the Lateran Council that once a weapon
or technology that can be weaponized is developed, it almost
inevitably ends up on the battlefield. Specific arms control
regimes have had some success in this area, but the general
rule is that technology drives weapon development and those
developed are eventually used in warfare.
I will start with cyber conflict. While cyber technology is
not really new, its future uses leave it squarely in the category
of emerging factors. The potential uses, and dangers, of cyber
technology are only beginning to be understood. Cyber
capabilities were viewed by top national security professionals
and policymakers as the most dangerous of emerging
capabilities in a recent survey conducted by Foreign Policy.139
138. John D. Banusiewicz, Lynn Outlines New Cybersecurity Effort, FED.
INFO. & NEWS DISPATCH, INC., June 16, 2011.
139. See The FP Survey: The Future of War, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar./Apr.
2012,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/The_Future_of_War?print=ye
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Of course, the general availability of cyber means of armed
conflict is part of what causes the concern. Many nations,
including both China and the United States, have
institutionalized their cyber forces.140 A recent estimate
suggests that 140 nations already have or are actively building
cyber capabilities within their military.141 The recent malware
packages known as Stuxnet, Flame, and Red October aptly
illustrate that states are already using cyber space to conduct
military activities that cause harm, similar to kinetic
operations.142
Additionally, non-state actors and even individuals have
access to cyber weapons. Symantec estimates that Stuxnet
could be created by as few as five to ten highly trained
computer technicians in as little as six months.143 Non-state
actors have been known to develop sophisticated malware that
cause great damage.144
s&hidecomments=yes&page=full (ranking cyberwarfare at a 4.6 on a 1-7 scale,
1 being the largest threat and 7 being the least threat); Micah Zenko, The
Future
of
War,
FOREIGN
POL’Y,
Mar./Apr.
2011,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/the_future_of_war.
(Mar./Apr.
140. See Tania Branigan, Chinese Army to Target Cyber War Threat, THE
GUARDIAN,
July
22,
2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/22/chinese-army-cyber-wardepartment; Andrew Gray, Pentagon Approves Creation of Cyber Command,
REUTERS, June 23, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/24/us-usapentagon-cyber-idUSTRE55M78920090624; Graham H. Todd, Armed Attack
in Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare with an Asymmetric Definition,
64 A.F. L. REV. 65, 96 (2009).
141. Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Civilians in Cyberwarfare:
Casualties, 13 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 249, 249 (2010).
142. See STUXNET Malware Analysis Paper, CODEPROJECT (Sep. 11,
2011), http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/246545/Stuxnet-Malware-AnalysisPaper (explaining Stuxnet was created to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program);
Full Analysis of Flame’s Command and Control Servers, SECURELIST (Sep. 17,
2012),
http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/750/
Full_Analysis_of_Flame_s_Command_Control_servers
(explaining
Flame
malware, the advanced cyber-espionage tool, was a large scale campaign
targeting several countries in the Middle East); Red October Computer Virus
Found, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/
news/9800946/Red-October-computer-virus-found.html
(explaining
Red
October focused targeting countries in eastern Europe).
143. Josh Halliday, STUXNET Worm is the ‘Work of a National
Government
Agency’,
THE
GUARDIAN,
Sept.
24,
2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/sep/24/stuxnet-worm-nationalagency.
144. See David Kleinbard & Richard Richtmyer, U.S. Catches ‘Love’ Virus:
Quickly Spreading Virus Disables Multimedia Files, Spawns Copycats,
CNNMONEY,
May
5,
2000,
http://money.cnn.com/2000/05/05
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Moving on to nanotechnology, it is “the understanding and
control of matter at the nanoscale, at dimensions between
approximately 1 and 100 nanometers, where unique
phenomena enable novel applications.”145 Nanotechnology has
already proven its value.146 For example, “a nanoparticle . . .
has shown 100 percent effectiveness in eradicating the
hepatitis C virus in laboratory testing.”147 The U.S Government
Accountability Office reported:
From fiscal years 2006 to 2010, the National
Science and Technology Council (NSTC)
reported more than a doubling of National
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) member
agencies’
funding
for
nanotechnology
environmental, health, and safety (EHS)
research—from approximately $38 million to
$90 million. Reported EHS research funding also
rose as a percentage of total nanotechnology
funding over the same period, ending at about 5
percent in 2010.148
And the United States is not alone. China and Russia are also
“openly investing significant amounts of money in
nanotechnology.”149
As with other innovations, nanotechnology is well on its
way to being at the forefront of military operations. Between
/technology/loveyou/ (describing how the “I Love You” virus swept through
banks, securities firms, and Web companies causing damage).
145. What it is and How it Works, NAT’L NANOTECHNOLOGY INST.,
http://nano.gov/nanotech-101 (last visited Feb. 6, 2013).
146. David Brown, Making Steam Without Boiling Water, Thanks to
Nanoparticles,
WASH.
POST,
Nov.
19,
2012,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-19/national/35505658_1_steamnanoparticles-water (“It shows you could make steam in an artic
environment.”).
147. Dexter Johnson, Nanoparticle Completely Eradicates Hepatitis C
Virus,
IEEE
SPECTRUM
(July
17,
2012),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/nanoclast/semiconductors/nanotechnology/nanoparticl
e-completely-eradicates-hepatitis-cvirus?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A
+IeeeSpectrumSemiconductors+%28IEEE+Spectrum%3A+Semiconductors%2
9; see also “Nanorobot” Can be Programmed to Target Different Diseases,
PHYS.ORG,
July
16,
2012,
http://phys.org/news/2012-07-nanorobotdiseases.html (explaining the programmable nature of the nanoparticle makes
it useful against cancer and other viral infections).
148. US Government Accountability Office Releases Report on
Nanotechnology EHS Research Performance, NANOWERK, June 22, 2012,
http://www.nanowerk.com/news2/newsid=25691.php.
149. See Blake & Imburgia, supra note 131, at 180.
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2001 and 2006, the Department of Defense spent over $1.2
Billion on nanotechnology research.150 Blake and Imburgia
argue that nanotechnology will significantly affect future
weapons and warfare. They write:
Scientists believe nanotechnology can be used to
develop controlled and discriminate biological
and nerve agents; invisible, intelligence
gathering devices that can be used for covert
activities almost anywhere in the world; and
artificial viruses that can enter into the human
body without the individual’s knowledge. So
called ‘nanoweapons’ have the potential to create
more intense laser technologies as well as selfguiding bullets that can direct themselves to a
target based on artificial intelligence. Some
experts also believe nanotechnology possesses
the potential to attack buildings as a ‘swarm of
nanoscale robots programmed only to disrupt
the electrical and chemical systems in a
building,’ thus avoiding the collateral damage a
kinetic strike on that same building would
cause.151
Nanotechnology will also eventually produce more
powerful and efficient bombs, and result in miniature nuclear
weapons.152 It will lead to the creation of microscopic nanobots
that can act as sensors to gather information or as weapons to
attack humans.153 The results of nanotechnology will be
150. Josh Wolfe & Dan van den Bergh, Nanotech Takes on Homeland
Terror,
FORBES.COM,
Aug.
14,
2006,
http://www.forbes.com/2006/08/11/nanotech-terror-cepheid-homelandin_jw_0811soapbox_inl.html.
151. See Blake & Imburgia, supra note 131, at 180.
152. Military
Uses of Nanotechnology:
The
Future
of
War,
THENANOAGE.COM, http://www.thenanoage.com/military.htm (last visited Feb.
7, 2013).7, 2013).
153. Scientists and the University of California, Berkeley, are already
working on the Micromechanical Flying Insect Project; see Micromechanical
Flying
Insect,
U.C.
BERKELEY,
http://robotics.eecs.berkeley.edu/~ronf/mfi.html/index.html (last visited Feb. 7,
2013) (describing the goal of micromechanical flying insect project is to develop
a 25 mm device capable of sustained autonomous flight); Nanotech Weaponry,
CENTER
FOR
RESPONSIBLE
NANOTECHNOLOGY
(Feb.
12,
2004),
http://www.crnano.typepad.com/crnblog/2004/02/nanotech_weapon.html
(explaining molecular manufacturing could lead to a weapon capable of
seeking and injecting toxin into unprotected humans); Caroline Perry, MassProduction Sends Robot Insects Flying, LIVE SCI., Apr. 18, 2012,
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weapons that are smaller, more mobile, and more potent;
sensors that are quicker and more accurate, and platforms with
greater range, effect, and lethality.
In addition to the means of warfare I have discussed, let
me also discuss a method of attack—the method of latent
attack. A latent attack is when a weapon of some kind is placed
in position, but will not be triggered until sometime in the
future. The attack may be triggered by a signal sent by the
weapon’s creator or even by the victim’s own actions. Though
possible with viruses and nanotechnology delivery systems, the
classic latent attack is done via computer malware.154 The
application of this form of emerging warfare as it relates to
sales of weapons or military equipment is significant.
To illustrate, assume the United State sells F-16 aircraft to
other countries, some of which the United States is not sure
will remain allies. As a precautionary measure, the aircraft
engineers embed some code in the targeting system that
prevents that aircraft from targeting United States aircrafts.
Such a valuable capability and tactic raises interesting legal
issues which I will discuss next.
D. EMERGING LAW

Emerging technology will require emerging law. There are
http://www.livescience.com/19773-mini-robot-production-nsf-ria.html (stating
a new technology will soon allow clones of robotic insects to be mass produced).
154. The Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, responsible for
maintaining America’s arsenal of nuclear weapons, discovered its computer
systems contained Chinese-made network switches which are used to manage
data traffic on computer networks. See Steve Stecklow, U.S. Nuclear Lab
Removes Chinese Tech Over Security Fears, REUTERS, Jan. 7, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/07/us-huawei-alamosidUSBRE90608B20130107.
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two particular areas of emerging law that I will discuss and
both need to evolve in order to keep pace with advancing
technologies. The first emerging area of law is the principles of
distinction and discrimination.
Article 48 of API states the foundational LOAC principle of
distinction: belligerents may “direct their operations
only against military objectives.”155 API Article 51, paragraph 2
reinforces that norm: “The civilian population as such, as well
as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.” 156 In
contrast, the principle of discrimination, or the prohibition on
indiscriminate attacks, comes from API Article 51.4, and
prohibits attacks which are “not directed at a specific military
object” and “those which employ a method or means of combat
which cannot be directed at a specific military objective” or
“which employ a method or means of combat the effects of
which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and
consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike
military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without
distinction.”157 The principle of discrimination is considered “an
implementation of the principle of distinction.”158
Future weapons present options that are difficult to
analyze under the existing law. For example, assume that the
United States wants to kill a foreign enemy leader and chooses
to do so by way of a DNA-linked virus. In order to get the virus
into the vicinity of the enemy leader, a covert operator spreads
the virus liberally in the area where the covert operator
frequents. The virus will infect thousands of civilians but will
only have a lethal effect on the enemy leader. I remind you,
first of all, that these restrictions only apply to “attacks.”
Analyzing the law, one might argue that API Article 51.4(c)
would preclude the attack because it was “of a nature to strike
military objectives (the enemy leader) and civilians or civilian
objects without distinction.” However, one might equally make
the argument that the attack did not “strike” civilians; it
merely used or inconvenienced civilians. The attack ultimately
discriminated when it finally exercised its lethal payload on the
155.
156.
157.
158.

See Protocol I, supra note 65, art. 48.
See id. art. 51.2.
See id. art. 51.4.
JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 43 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005),
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-internationalhumanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.

JENSEN Article 5.1.13

2013]

5/21/2013 12:03 AM

FUTURE WAR, FUTURE LAW

321

enemy leader. Is infecting the general populace a violation of
distinction even though the virus is absolutely discriminating
in the attack?
Jeremy Richmond made a similar analysis of the Stuxnet
computer malware and concluded that had it been used during
armed conflict, it would have complied with the LOAC despite
its general dispersion.159 Further clarity in this area of
emerging technology will provide guidance to states as future
technologies develop and continue to be used.
I have already introduced the idea of precautions and the
potential impact of re-engineering as a factor in the
commander’s proportionality analysis. API Article 57 requires
that commanders do “everything feasible to verify that the
objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian
objects”160 and “take all feasible precautions in the choice of
means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in
any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians and damage to civilian objects.”161
Does that mean that a commander cannot choose to use a
weapon that can potentially be re-engineered and used again
against civilians? Or does it mean that he has to weigh the
likelihood of it being re-engineered and the likelihood of it
being used against civilians? Or does it mean that he has to do
everything feasible to prevent it from being re-engineered
without having to consider the potential effects if it is?
Currently, the law is unclear as to the application of the
proportionality standard to this analysis. This is another area
where, as technology advances, the law should advance as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
Let me now conclude with a quote from David Ignatius. He
stated:
The ‘laws of war’ may sound like an antiquated
concept in this age of robo-weapons. But, in
truth, a clear international legal regime has
never been more needed: It is a fact of modern
life that people in conflict zones live in the
perpetual cross hairs of deadly weapons. Rules

159. See Richmond, supra 104, at 894.
160. See Protocol I, supra note 65, art. 57.2(a)(i).
161. See id. art. 57.2(a)(ii)
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are needed for targets and targeters alike.162
I would add that it is not just people living in combat zones, but
potentially people anywhere in the world are in the cross hairs
of deadly weapons.
Now is the time to act. In anticipation of these
developments, the international community needs to recognize
the gaps in the current LOAC and seek solutions in advance of
a future situation. As the LOAC evolves to face anticipated
future threats, it will help ensure that advancing technologies
comply with the foundational principles of the LOAC and
future armed conflicts remain constrained by law.

162. David Ignatius, Dazzling New Weapons Require New Rules for War,
WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2010; see generally Gary Marchant, Douglas Sylvester &
Kenneth W. Abbott, Nanotechnology Regulation: The United States Approach,
in NEW GLOBAL FRONTIERS IN REGULATION: THE AGE OF N ANOTECHNOLOGY
189 (Graeme Hodge et al. eds., 2007); Kenneth W. Abbot, Douglas S. Sylvester
& Gary E. Marchant, Transnational Regulation of Nanotechnology: Reality or
Romanticism?,
in
INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK
ON
REGULATING
NANOTECHNOLOGIES (Edward Elgar ed., forthcoming); Kenneth W. Abbott,
Gary E. Marchant, & Douglas J. Sylvester, A Framework Convention for
Nanotechnology, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10931 (2006); Gary E. Marchant, Douglas
J. Sylvester & Kenneth W. Abbott, A New Soft Law Approach to
Nanotechnology Oversight: A Voluntary Product Certification Scheme, 28
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y. 123 (2010).
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